Aviation Policy News: Lessons from the deadly DC plane collision

In this issue:

• Lessons from the DC plane collision
• Why “more funding” won’t solve our air traffic control problems
• Did DEI lower air traffic controller performance?
• FAA misses congressional targets on remote/digital towers
• UK government supports third Heathrow runway
• News Notes
• Quotable Quotes

Lessons From the DCA Collision

I’ve been following the National Transportation Safety Bureau (NTSB) investigation of the tragic Jan. 29 collision of an Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines regional jet that killed 67 people. So far, we know that the helicopter was above its maximum allowed altitude and that its communications with the Reagan National International Airport (DCA) control tower were not adequate. Two key questions at this stage are:

• Were the primary failures due to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air safety regulations, air traffic control shortcomings, or something else?
• What should be changed to prevent or minimize similar tragedies?

Taking air traffic control first, the DCA tower (like many FAA facilities) is understaffed, with only 23 of 28 fully certified air traffic controllers. On the night of the crash, normal policy would have had one controller assigned to helicopters, instead of one handling both civilian air traffic and helicopters.

The regional jet was equipped with functioning safety systems, including the TCAS collision-warning system, which provided a last-minute warning to pull up (which the pilot began before the impact with the Blackhawk).

Unfortunately, although both aircraft used VHF radios, they were on different frequencies, so neither cockpit crew could hear the other aircraft’s communications with the tower, meaning they did not have “situational awareness” of what was likely to happen due to intersecting flight paths.

While most U.S. airspace is shared between military and civilian air traffic, FAA does not set equipment standards for military aircraft. The Blackhawk did have the ADS-B/Out system required on all aviation that flies in controlled airspace, but for some reason, it was not broadcasting. Had it been, the tower controller would have been able to see where the helicopter was and where it was heading.

On Feb. 19, Politico reported a statement by Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) that a Department of Defense official told her in 2023 that Army helicopters from Ft. Belvoir, such as this one, “execute 100 percent of their missions with ADS-B off,” in the Washington, D.C., area.

Both The Washington Post and ABC News have researched what FAA knew about the potential for airliner/helicopter collisions at DCA. The Post found 104 TCAS collision warnings related to helicopters and airliners at DCA over the past decade, and about 25% of the helicopters involved were military. They reported that controllers informed air traffic managers about their concerns based on these warnings in a written report in 2020. The controllers suggested changing the helicopter routes along the Potomac next to DCA. One proposal was to change Route 4 to run above I-295. But no changes were made.

ABC News reviewed reports filed by airline pilots about close calls with helicopters at DCA. FAA maintains a voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting System, ASRS. Pilots, air traffic controllers, and other aviation people can document safety problems they have experienced without fear of reprisal. Those reports are shared with FAA management, NASA, and other researchers with the intent of stimulating ideas for correcting safety-related problems.

In perusing ASRS reports dating back to 1991, ABC News identified at least 15 reported close calls between airliners and helicopters near Reagan National. Some pilots wrote that the DCA flight space was “an accident waiting to happen.” Four of the 15 reports dealt with the approach to Runway 33, where last month’s fatal collision occurred.

The Washington Post also obtained ADS-B data from Flightradar24 showing daily aircraft landings on Runway 33 crossing helicopter Route 4. The graphic shows the very small margin between the helicopters’ nominal maximum altitude of 200 feet and the downward flight path of airliners between 3,000 and 4,000 feet from the runway. Nearly all cross Route 4 at between 200 and 300 feet—way too close for comfort.

Based on what we know as I write this in mid-February, the most important policy change would be to remove the long-standing helicopter routes along the Potomac near Reagan National. Yet FAA—the aviation safety regulator—has done nothing all these years as TCAS reports and ASRS reports kept showing the obvious hazard. This is a regulatory failure, and the question is why the agency did nothing.

Some suggest that the Pentagon is too powerful for FAA to overcome, if it made such a proposal. So perhaps such a change would require action by Congress. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), who chairs the Senate Commerce Committee, told Politico on Feb. 14 that “There could easily be legislative changes—one natural area of inquiry is what helicopter routes are allowed at busy commercial airports.”

That makes sense, but I wonder about its political feasibility. Several friends who live in the D.C. metro area tell me that the Potomac helicopter routes were in part selected to minimize complaints from constituents—with helicopter noise being a perennial concern of residents in the affluent D.C. Palisades neighborhood and Arlington and Alexandria riverfronts. I wonder if that point be investigated by The Washington Post or other outlets.
 
We will learn more when NTSB releases its next report on the tragic collision. There may be additional needs for policy changes, in addition to what I’ve noted here.

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Why “More Funding” Will Not Solve U.S. Air Traffic Control’s Problems

President Donald Trump recently proposed to fix our antiquated air traffic control (ATC) system by implementing “a great computerized system…brand new…done by two or three companies.”

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, meeting with American Airlines CEO Robert Isom on Feb. 12, echoed Trump’s call and promoted the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE) plan to “plug in to help upgrade our aviation system.”

The same day, Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Sen. John Hoeven (R-ND) sent a letter to FAA urging the agency to work with Congress to increase funding for operations, facilities, and air traffic controller training.

These well-meaning proposals misunderstand the nature of the FAA’s funding problem. FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is required to operate on a cash basis—meaning annual appropriations from Congress, paid for mostly by taxes paid by airline passengers. But as Dorothy Robyn points out in a new Brookings Institute report, annual cash funding is a primary reason for its aging and obsolete facilities and dysfunctional procurement system. Air traffic control is essentially a high-tech service business—a public utility. Like toll roads and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), utilities finance large capital investments by issuing bonds backed by the revenue stream from their paying customers.

Modernizing air traffic control systems based on annual appropriations means that a new system needed in several hundred ATO facilities must be purchased in small annual installments, often stretching over 15 years or more. That means by the time the last facilities receive the new system, it may already be approaching obsolescence. ATC utilities such as Nav Canada can purchase the entire system all at once and roll it out to all facilities within a year or two.

According to the 2023 report of the FAA’s Safety Review Team, the ATO’s 21 high-altitude centers range from 56 to 64 years old and are in poor condition. They need replacing, but with today’s technology, there is no need for 21 centers spread out across the country. Three or four high-tech centers would provide redundancy in case one went offline, and there would be large economies of scale in a small number of larger facilities.

Doing this would require both long-term revenue bonds (prohibited) and overcoming Senate opposition to “losing a key facility in my state.”

Basically, our Air Trafic Organization is a would-be “high-tech service business trapped in a regulatory agency that is constrained by federal budget and acquisition rules, burdened by a flawed funding mechanism…and micromanaged by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget,” as Robyn explains.

Robyn was the infrastructure czar in the Clinton administration’s second term and was a strong supporter of the Clinton Department of Transportation’s (DOT) proposed U.S. Air Traffic Services Corporation, which would have pulled air traffic control out of FAA and set it up as a user-funded government corporation, analogous to the TVA. Like many New Democrats, she supported the 2016-18 House bill championed by then-House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee Chair Bill Shuster and endorsed by President Trump.

I’m glad to see Elon Musk’s DOGE taking a serious look at our air traffic control problems. But there will be no high-tech quick fixes for the fundamental shortcomings of our system. We still cling to the wrong model—a tax-funded, cash-basis federal bureaucracy micromanaged by Congress and OMB.

William Eggers, executive director of the Deloitte Center for Government Insights, emailed me in December regarding potential savings from changing the ATO to a public utility. His back-of-the-envelope savings figures included $14 billion in annual appropriations by taking the ATO out of the federal budget ($140 billion over 10 years), plus a finding from a 2017 Deloitte study that real technology changes could bring about $70 billion in savings over 30 years—adjusted to current dollars that’s about $90 billion.

Finally, you have probably seen in previous issues of this newsletter that “more than 60 countries” have shifted their ATC system from their transport ministry to a user-funded public utility since New Zealand originated this trend in 1987. That number is now obsolete. In a forthcoming Reason Foundation report on aviation infrastructure, my colleague Marc Scribner reviewed the latest figures from the air navigation service provider (ANSP) trade group Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO). As of this year, 98 countries make use of air traffic control utilities: 72 as ATC utilities spun off from transport ministries and another 26 operated by multi-country providers: Roberts FIR (3 African countries), COCESNA (six Central American countries) and ASECNA (17 African countries).

Air traffic control in the United States is falling ever further behind. 

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Did DEI Lower Air Traffic Controller Performance?

One knee-jerk reaction of some commentators following the deadly collision near Reagan National Airport was that prior presidential administrations had hired and trained air traffic controllers who were not fully qualified—and, therefore, the claims went that air traffic controller errors were likely the cause of this devastating accident. That allegation relates to something real, but there is no evidence that today’s air traffic controllers have not been properly selected or trained. Here’s the real story, as this newsletter documented at the time.

Before 2014, the majority of successful applicants to be trained as air traffic controllers were graduates of two-year or four-year coursework at several dozen colleges and universities that offered FAA-approved degrees in air traffic control. The program is called the Collegiate Training Initiative (CTI).

The Obama administration wanted a more diverse workforce, so in 2014, they began a large-scale effort to recruit controller training candidates off-the-street (hoping to recruit more minorities and women). To tilt the scales, they created a “biographical questionnaire” (BQ) asking all sorts of questions and scoring them in a never-revealed manner. CTI graduates were required to also respond to the biographical questionnaire—and lots of them did not “pass,” for undisclosed reasons. Those students had wasted several years of time and tuition, and some launched a class-action lawsuit against FAA. Believe it or not, it is still going on, with the CTI grads represented by Mountain States Legal Foundation.

FAA dropped the biographical questionnaire in 2018, during the first Trump administration.

Do I think the four-year period when fewer CTI grads were accepted for training at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City led to poorly qualified controllers who are still out there messing up? No, I don’t, and here’s why.

Those accepted for academy training from 2014 through 2017 still had to complete the coursework with a passing grade and then pass the objective Air Traffic Skills Assessment (ATSA). Those who passed then got assigned to an air traffic control facility (tower, TRACON, or center) for rigorous on-the-job training. Some trainees take as many as three years to be certified for the kind of facility they are assigned to—and others wash out. It’s hard to believe that anyone who passes that set of hurdles is not qualified to control traffic.

Of course, if poorly qualified candidates did get into the academy in those years, and ended up not able to pass ATSA, or were unable to get certified in a facility, then FAA wasted a lot of money trying to fit square pegs into round holes. However, since, to the best of my knowledge, the FAA has never released washout rates for the academy or its facilities, we have no way of knowing if that happened. I would be surprised if the average off-the-street candidate and the average CTI graduate had the same washout rates, but FAA has left us in the dark. Congress could have mandated the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or the Department of Transportation Inspector General to obtain that kind of data, but it never did.

The even better news is that recently retired FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker strengthened the Collegiate Training Initiative program, offering those CTI schools that upgraded their air traffic control curriculum to cover more of what the academy teaches a head-start for their graduates. Assuming they pass the ATSA, they can go directly to on-the-job training at a facility.

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FAA Misses Congressional Targets on Remote/Digital Towers
By Marc Scribner

Readers of this newsletter will be familiar with the growing popularity of remote/digital air traffic control towers around the world, as well as the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) glacial progress in deploying these technologies in the United States. As part of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Congress included Section 621 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 47124(h)), which was aimed at spurring FAA to clear a path to U.S. deployment. The June 2024 issue of this newsletter detailed the remote tower provisions contained in Sec. 621 of the FAA reauthorization that was enacted into law on May 16.

Unfortunately—although perhaps not surprisingly—FAA has missed the target implementation deadlines specified in the law. To recap, Sec. 621 of the 2024 FAA reauthorization included the following key provisions that were designed to refresh FAA policy on remote towers:

• Within 180 days of enactment (i.e., by November 12, 2024), FAA must publish milestones for achieving testing and deployment approval. The primary purpose of this provision was to force FAA to spell out exactly what it wanted from remote tower vendors and sponsors. For years, FAA had introduced new draft system technical requirements by simply posting them on its website unannounced. FAA’s ad hoc approach to remote tower technical requirements had bedeviled sponsors for years and was the principal reason for Saab abandoning the remote tower project at Leesburg Executive Airport after nine years. This provision also required FAA to “assess the safety benefits of a remote tower against the lack of an existing tower.”
• By the end of 2024, FAA must expand system design approval and validation to at least three locations outside the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. This provision partially reversed a costly 2022 FAA decision to force vendors to install their systems at the Tech Center rather than allow those systems to be evaluated at the airports at which they would be operated.
• FAA should not interpret this section to invalidate any existing progress made by sponsors toward system design approval. This provision was included to protect the lone active remote tower project at Northern Colorado Regional Airport.
• Within 180 days of enactment and every six months thereafter through the September 2028 term of the law, FAA must brief congressional overseers on their progress toward implementing Sec. 621.

To date, FAA has failed to meet those first two key provisions of Sec. 621. System design and operational approval milestones have not been published as required under the law. Even worse, just weeks after the law’s enactment and in clear contradiction of Congress’s intent, FAA posted another draft technical requirements document on its website without warning. FAA has also not taken any visible actions to expand system design approval evaluations outside the Atlantic City Tech Center.

According to documents obtained by Reason Foundation, the Raytheon/Frequentis joint venture is the sole remaining vendor in the system design approval process. This team took over the remote tower project in Northern Colorado after the original vendor, Searidge, quit in Oct. 2023 after five years of work due to FAA’s Kafkaesque approval process. Initial air traffic evaluations and data collection were tentatively scheduled to begin this month at the Tech Center.

These documents from FAA state, “For a system to become operational in the [National Airspace System], the vendor system must obtain [system design approval] at the Tech Center,” which shows FAA has not made progress in expanding this process to at least three airports outside the Tech Center as required by Congress. FAA also indicated that its sudden publication of new draft technical requirements in June 2024 delayed the Raytheon/Frequentis installation at the Tech Center by at least four months.

While Congress had hoped Sec. 621 would be a cure for FAA’s foot-dragging on remote/digital towers, the law alone has proven to be insufficient. It is increasingly apparent that Congress must make a concerted effort to force FAA into compliance with the law if it wishes to see positive change. Further, leadership on this subject from the top of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) has been lacking and is badly needed. With the new management at USDOT currently examining bureaucratic problems hindering air traffic control modernization, they should take a close look at FAA’s ongoing failure on remote/digital towers.

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UK Government Supports Heathrow Third Runway

The new Labour government, with its emphasis on economic growth, has given the green light to the long-planned third runway at Heathrow International Airport (LHR). As The Economist pointed out (Feb. 1 issue), Heathrow lags behind major hub airports in Europe that compete for long-haul air travel. For example, Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS) has six runways and Frankfurt (FRA) has four, compared with Heathrow’s two.

The magazine also notes that, “The arguments against (LHR) expansion are especially weak. Take noise pollution…The parts of west London that jets noisily fly over include well-heeled suburbs whose residents are adept at kicking up a fuss. But those areas owe some of their prosperity to economic spillovers from Heathrow…Also the noisiest models, like Boeing’s 747, are on the way out…Air pollution is a similar story. Newer engines are cleaner. Nearly 40% of Heathrow’s air pollution comes from ground vehicles. Many will be electric before long.”

Incumbent airlines operating at Heathrow cautiously endorsed the plan, but with reservations. The Heathrow Airlines Operators Committee (AOC) complained about the airport’s high costs and demanded an “urgent and fundamental reform” of Heathrow’s regulatory model. I have also questioned that model, which is analogous to traditional U.S. “rate of return” utility regulation, which provides incentives to have as high a cost base as possible because the allowable return on investment is based on that cost base.

The week before the article on LHR’s third runway, The Economist’s Bagehot columnist offered a modest critique of the current slot system at the airport. “Control of slots—the right of an airline to take off or land from an airport at a particular time—is the biggest constraint on competition.” Bagehot goes on to write that “The slots regime is a mid-century relic. In Britain, as around the world, rights are grandfathered: as long as an airline uses a slot 80% of the time, it can hold onto it free, in perpetuity…At Heathrow, 99% of the slots are grandfathered; spare ones come up for sale rarely and at a stonking price.”

The Economist goes on to note that increased runway capacity will open Heathrow to more flights, but that the Labor government has no interest in slots reform. The columnist promotes the auctioning of the new slots made possible by the new runway. But that would still leave incumbent slots in place, in perpetuity. Britain could do better than that.

First of all, since the country left the European Union, it is no longer constrained by EU slots regulations. Second, LHR already uses a modest extent of variable landing fees—higher fees at busy daytime hours and lower fees overnight. It also charges higher landing fees to noisier aircraft. No longer constrained by EU slots regulations, it could abolish all slots at the time the new runway opens and shift to an open market based on time-of-day runway use fees (for both landings and takeoffs, which both use still-limited runway capacity, and there may be higher demand for landings at some hours and lower demand for take-offs at some hours).

So, if the Labour government truly wants to promote economic growth, one way to do this is to replace cartel-like slots with market-priced runways. The new runway will offer a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make this change.

Note: Back in 2007, due to interest expressed by U.S. Transportation Secretary Mary Peters, economist Ben Dachis and I did a major research project to evaluate a runway pricing system for the New York airports. Our work was built on findings of an FAA research project that included a “war game” simulation of such a pricing system, with participants that included airport operations people and airline schedulers. It’s a long report, but it is still very relevant since no airport has yet implemented anything like this.

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News Notes

Antiquated NOTAMs System’s Latest Outage
On Feb. 1, the aging Notice to Air Men (NOTAM) system stopped working and a backup system was turned on by noon the following day. FlightAware reported 1,313 delayed flights and 80 flight cancellations due to the outage. There was a much longer outage in Jan. 2023, which led to a 90-minute nationwide ground stop—the first since the 9/11 attack in 2001. For more details see my article in the Jan. 2023 issue of this newsletter.

Norway to Operate 23 Towers Remotely
Norwegian air navigation service provider (ANSP) Avinor is well under way on a project with Kongsberg Geospatial to upgrade and expand its pioneering remote tower center in Bodo to handle 23 small airports by 2027. The schedule calls for 15 airports controlled from Bodo by March 2025 and ultimately to between 21 and 23 by 2027. Bodo is already the world’s largest remote tower center and will likely retain that title for the foreseeable future.

CAE Operating Controller Training Center with Nav Canada
Skiesmag.com reported last month that CAE is now operating an Air Traffic Services Training Center in Montreal. Nav Canada and CAE announced a partnership for this project in April 2024, and on Oct. 28 it began its first set of courses. The new facility was officially inaugurated on Jan. 16, 2025. Like much of the world, Nav Canada faces a controller shortage, but the new Training Center will be open to other ANSPs, as well. The plan is to graduate 150 to 175 candidates per year, who will proceed to on-the-job training at ATC facilities in Canada and elsewhere.

Charter Airline Purchases Production Slots for BWB Freighters
Nolinor Aviation, a Canadian charter carrier, has reserved an undisclosed number of production slots for Natilus’s Kona blended wing body (BWB) regional freighter. Nolinor currently operates the world’s largest fleet of 737 freighters, tankers, and passenger planes under U.S. charter. Natilus had previously announced about 460 pre-orders from customers including U.S. cargo airline Ameriflight.

London City Airport May Be on the Market
Owners OMERS and AIMCo. have hired an investment bank to explore interest in a possible sale of 50% of the airport. Infralogic reports that Macquarie Asset Management plans to buy Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan’s 25% share in the airport. The U.K. government is supporting London City’s plan to increase its capacity from 6.5 million annual passengers to 9 million. Back in 2016, the current owners acquired the airport for £2 billion, which independent advisor David Bentley estimates reflects an EBITDA multiple of 60, far higher than any known airport valuation.

Vinci to Propose Concession for €6 Billion Lisbon Airport
For the planned replacement of the existing Lisbon airport, the Portuguese government has asked Vinci’s ANA Aeroportos to submit a formal proposal to design/build/finance/operate/maintain the new airport at no cost to the government. After receiving the proposal, the government will consider design changes, airport charges, and the financial model, and likely propose changes. Vinci is currently the world’s 5th-largest airport company.

Breeze Airways Has First Quarterly Profit
Low-cost carrier Breeze, which launched operations in May 2021, reported on Jan. 23 that its fourth quarter of 2024 was its first with an operating profit. Breeze’s fleet is now up to 33 Airbus A220s, with 12 first-class seats, 45 extra-legroom seats, and 80 economy seats. It now serves 66 destinations, and it increased its seat-miles by 52% last year. Its business model links cities that currently lack non-stop service.

LAX Automated People Mover Enters Final Year of Testing
This year’s operational testing of the $2 billion Automated People Mover will move from the parking structure and rental car center area to the Central Terminal Area, Public Works Financing reported in its Nov. 2024 issue. The project has experienced cost overruns and contractor disputes, and last year had its credit rating temporarily downgraded by Fitch Ratings. If all goes well this year, the APM will start carrying passengers in Jan. 2026.

Spanish ANSP Launches International Division
ENAIRE, Spain’s air navigation service provider (ANSP) has won government approval to launch Enaire Global Services (EGS), reported Aviation Week (Jan. 15, 2025). EGS will seek air navigation service contracts in new markets and business areas. Its three initial business areas will be contract air traffic management, technology consulting, and drone/new user services. ENAIRE is Europe’s fourth-largest ANSP, providing ATC services to 21 Spanish airports, approach and departure control, and high-altitude service including overflights.

Malaysia Airports Buyout Succeeds
Infralogic (Feb. 13) reported that the Gateway Development Alliance and its consortium have received shareholder approval for 98.68% of the shares in Malaysia Airports Holdings (MAHB). The new owner will be delisting MAHB from the stock exchange. Among the investors in the Alliance are Khazanah Nasional and Employees Provident Fund.

Boom XB-1 Flies Supersonic
Boom Supersonic’s test aircraft, XB-1, made the last test flight in its 11-month test program, at Mojave Air & Space Port in California on Feb. 10. It achieved its main objective, to exceed Mach 1, which it did at Mach 1.18 at 36,514 ft. Boom hoped to demonstrate a “boomless cruise,” in which thicker air at lower altitudes reflects the boom away from the ground, under certain conditions. If they can make this work in the production model, the much larger production model could cruise at Mach 1.3 over land, assuming federal aviation regulations were changed to allow such speeds.

Fraport Wins Greek Airport Concession
A coalition assembled by German airport operator Fraport won a 40-year concession to upgrade and operate the Kalamata Airport in southern Greece. It and its partners plan to invest €28.3  million in the first three years to expand and modernize the terminal. Fraport operates 14 regional airports in Greece.

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Quotable Quotes

“It’s crazy that there’s been a national conversation around air traffic control staffing levels, and very little questioning of our air traffic model. There hasn’t been enough talking around how the agency is managed or how it acquires technology. . . . The first Trump administration tried to reform air traffic control along the lines of Canada’s non-profit model. The FAA would remain the regulator, but wouldn’t also be the service provider, which creates a conflict of interest and lack of accountability. They shouldn’t be supervising themselves! Instead, a stakeholder nonprofit charges airlines (instead of taxpayers) for their service. They issue bonds when they need to invest in technology, rather than relying on congressional appropriations. That’s one reason why they’re two to three decades ahead of the U.S. Of course, we could just license the same software as many other nations have done, but the FAA’s culture takes every wish list into account and puts the most cumbersome specs out to bid; the stuff often doesn’t work or takes decades to roll out—piece by piece.
—Gary Leff, “From 1920s Thinking to Digital Autonomy: After 100 Years, It’s Time to Rethink How Air Traffic Control Works,” View from the Wing, Feb. 13, 2025

“Autonomy for the air navigation service provider, and its separation from the [safety] regulatory oversight function is well-established in ICAO guidance material. It is evidenced that greater financial and operational autonomy for the ANSP has encouraged a business approach to service delivery and an improved quality of service. Separation from the regulatory oversight function enhances ATM performance and instills public confidence in the ANSP and the services it provides. Separation of provision from regulation is consistent with principles of good governance; the regulatory oversight function must be seen as independent and transparent. While this guidance material is only supplemental to standards and recommended practices (SARPs), it is of significance to ICAO’s strategic objectives of Safety and Efficiency.”
—International Civil Aviation Organization, “Separation of Air Navigation Services (ANS) Provision from Regulatory Oversight,” Conference on the Economics of Airports and Air Navigation Services, Montreal, 15 to 20 Sept. 2008

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The post Aviation Policy News: Lessons from the deadly DC plane collision appeared first on Reason Foundation.

Source: https://reason.org/aviation-policy-news/lessons-from-the-dca-collision/